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The Terminations Premium in Mortgage Coupon Rates:
Evidence on the Integration of Mortgage and Bond Markets*
Patric H.Hendershottand Kevin E. Villani
OhioState University and HUD
Financial markets have behaved somewhat differently in recentyears
than in the previous quarter century. Twochangesare particularly
relevant to this paper. First, interest rates have been more volatile
generally. Second, while all interest rates have risen to unprecedented
levels, mortgage rates have increased by more than rates on other
securities of comparable maturity. This contrasts markedly with the
previous quarter century, when mortgage rates were typically described
as "sluggish." We suspect that the second of these two phenomena
follows from the first. Mortgage rates contain a terminations premium
to compensate lenders for expected reductions in effective yields
relative to quoted coupons owing to borrowers prepaying at a faster
or slower rate, depending on which is to their economic benefit (and
to the detriment of the lender). An increase in interest rate uncertainty
increases expected reductions due to the terminations option and
raises the terminations premium in mortgage coupon rates. That is, the
coupon rate adjusts to maintain parity between the expected effective
yields on mortgages and securities without call options.
There are two pieces of evidence that interest rate uncertainty has
increasedin recent years. First, the importance the Federal Reserve
attached to interest rate stability was substantially reduced in late
l97'9 and 1980. One indication of this was the increase in the targeted
band for the federal funds rate from less than a percentage point In
*Anearlier version of this paper was presented at a joint session of the
Annual Meetings of the American Economic and FinanceAssociations, September 1980.-2-
1978 to percentage points on October 6,1979and as much as 7percentage
points in 1980. Second, the standard deviation of one-year inflation
forecasts of the participants In the Livingston survey rose above two
percentage points forthefirst time in 1979-80. Given a relationship
between interest rates and inflation, uncertain inflation Implies uncertain
interest rates.
Two specific questions are addressed in the present paper. First,
how much have mortgage coupon rates (more specifically, that on newly-
issued GNMA. pools) risen relative to a comparable maturity portfolio
of Treasury securities? Second, Is the increase reasonably attributed
to a rise in the terminations premium owing to an increase in interest
rate uncertainty or must an explanation appeal to other factors? To
answer these questions we first calculate the terminations premia Implied
by coupon rates and prices on newly-issued pools of GNMA securities
over the past several years under the assumption that the mortgage
market is fully integrated with capital markets generally. The
resulting "options premia" are then examined for their plausibility
(related empirically to reasonable proxies for interest rate uncertainty).
The first three sections of the paper provide a framework for
performingthe calculations. The sections include a method of valuing
poolsof level-payment mortgages when termination rates are certain,
a discussion of the impact of interest rate outcomes on termination
rates,andadescription of methodologies for measuring the terminations
premium in mortgage coupon rates. Basically, the premium is the difference
between the pool coupon rate and the internal rate of return on a portfolio
of Treasury securities with cash flows identical to those of the mortgage-3-
poolafter netting out payments for the terminations option. Premia
arecalculated in Section IV for the LO months fromJanuary1978to
April 1981 and are related empirically to proxies for interest rate
uncertainty. A summaryconcludesthe paper.
I. The Value of Mortgage Pools WhenTerminationRates are Certain
Theformula for the scheduled payment on a level-payment mortgage
with an initial principal of X dollars is:
(1.1) PAYSix(l+i)M/[(l+i)M_l],
where M is the maturity of the loan (the period over which the loan is
amortized), and I is the mortgage coupon rate. The scheduled outstanding
principal at time t on this mortgage is:
(1.2) PRS —xr(l÷i)M-
Theabove expressions hold whatever unitoftimeis chosen.1
The decline over time in thescheduled principal of level-payment
mortgagesresults exclusively from amortization. The cash-flowgenerated
by a portfolio or pool of mortgages will be greater than thisby the amount
of the servicing fee which is a percentage of theoutstanding principal.
Also, expost cash flow will exceed scheduled cash flow ifany mortgages prepay.
1These expressions also holdfor variable-rate and renegotiable mortgages
Ifinterest rates are expected to be unchanged in the future.-4-
Let denote the fraction of the N loans, each of valueX,in the pooi
that will terminate at time t and s be the servicing fee (the c superscript
indicates that the values are viewed as certain). The total payment on




where = andIbecause all mortgages are terminated by
T
period N. That is, the payment is simply the principal termination, less
the servicing fee, plus the scheduled payment (interest plus amortization)
on the remaining principal outstanding.
Now consider an existing pool k periods after origination where
is the fraction of the N mortgages in the original pool that are still
outstanding. The fraction of mortgages that will terminate in each period
t subsequent to k is defined as kt and the cummulative n-action of
t -1
mortgages that will be terminated by time t-l is denoted by =
j=k
"
Thetotal payment in time t(contingenton kt on a portfolio of mortgages
k-iperiods old is then:
(1.4)kPAYt =(k_s)rPR1
+(1_k)QkNPAY
The value of this mortgage pool is simply the discounted present




Becausethese payments are known with certainty, the appropriate discount
rates are the yields on risk-free pure-discount securities of the matching
maturity.2 That is,it-k is the yield on a riskiess pure discount bond
of maturity t-k. Although such yields are not directly observable
in the securities markets as coupon rates, capital markets willimplicitly
determine a unique spectrum of these yields, which when plotted form
a yield curve.3
Even though the cash flows of the pool are certain, interest-rate
uncertainty could affect the value of the pool through its effect on the
discount rates. The yields on pure discount default-free securities
might contain interest-rate risk or term prernia if the marginal investor
is averse to the risk that future rates might differ from thosecurrently
anticipated. The magnitude of these premia will reflect the degree of
uncertainty. Thus, for example, "flat" interest rate expectations might
generate an upward sloping yield curve, where the degree of slope reflects
the uncertainty of future interest rates and investor aversion to this
uncertainty .Becauseour focus is on the impact of interest-rate
uncertainty on the relative values of mortgage pools with certain and
2Garbade (1980) calculates kVC from equation (1.5),discountingmortgage
cash flows based on some multiple of FHAexperienceby the term structure
of Treasury yields. rkVC is described as "the market value" of a portfolio
of Treasury securities having the same (but certain) cash flows as the
mortgage pool. Next he determines the single"internal rate of return"
for the given kV° and cash flows. Finally, he adds a premium to this rate
just sufficient to equate the discounted present value of these cash flows
to the observed market price of GNMApools.Garbade does not develop an
interpretation of the premium.
enthe yield curve isflat,the single tin(1.5)is Curleyand
Guttentag's (l97) internal rate of return.-6-.
uncertaincash flows, we shall assume, for ease of exposition and with rio
loss of generality, that term prenila are zero and thus thata flat yield
curveinrpliesconstant interest rate expectations.
While prices for securities are generally quoted as a percent ofpar
value, weshallexpress prices as a fraction of par. Thus the price
at timekof a portfolio of securities is:
(1.6) kv/(k.
That is, the quoted price at time k is the marketvalueat time k as
a fraction of the principal still outstanding at time
Taxes have been ignored in the above analysis. This is permissible if
either:(1) the pool is trading at par so there is no need to distinguish
between capital gains and interest income which are taxed at differential
rates or (2) the marginal investor in the pool is a tax-exempt institution.
If neither of these conditions holds and if one knew the tax rate of the
marginal investor, then the differential tax treatment of gains and
interest could be accounted for directly.-7-
II.Interest Rates andTerminationsRates
The terminations rate for mortgages is akin to the mortality rate
forlife insurance companies. A "niorta].ity" table hasinfact been
calculated for FHA experience.5 Termination rates are often expressed
as some multiple, say 200percent,of actual (and projected) FH& repayment





where = . Thusthe fraction of the pool still outstanding
j=l"
(i-ø)that is repaid in a given period ()isx percent of the fraction
of apool withactual FHP experience that would be repaid in that same
100 100 period /(l4T
The terminations schedule on a mortgage pool is defined in terms of
all the terminations rates. The schedule is a random variable that depends
in a rather complex way on the initial subjective (joint conditional
Bayesian) probabilities that an individual mortgage will terminate in
each subsequent future period. We define the "most likely" terminations
schedule as the collection of termination rates that are giien the highest
initial subjective probabilities.
The timing of mortgage repayments is irrelevant to the
valuation of pools only if (1) the yield curve is flat and (2) the
mortgage pool is trading at par. Consider two pools, both carrying
5See Herzog (1981,p.21) for the latest available table.-8-
couponsequal to the currentnewissue coupon. If the yield curve is
upward sloping, indicating thatfutureinterest rates are expected to be
higher, then faster repayingpoolswill be valued above
slowerrepaying pools. And the converse is true ifthe yield curve is
downwardsloping. Onthe other hand, even if the yield curve is flat,
fasterand slower repayingpoolswith equal coupons will be valued
differently if this coupon differs from the current new issuecoupon.
For example, if the new-issue coupon exceeds that on theexistingpools,
then both existing pools will trade below par, with the slower paying
poolbeing furtherbelowpar.
Thefactthatthe terminations rate isnot known a priori would not
beof concern if these rates were unrelated to economic variables and
investors were indifferent to this uncertainty. One could simply project
the "most likely" rates from past experience and calculate the value of'
mortgage pools from equation (1.5) based on these rates.6 Unfortunately,
mortgage terminations reflect the exercise of the borrower's option which is
generally related to the observed course of interest rates.7 Moreover,
as we wiU indicate in the following section, the systematic relationship
between interest rates and termination experience causes investors to
care about the uncertainty of termination rates.
6This is theprocedure followed in some studies, e.g., Cater and Lloyd (1980).
7For evidence on this point, seeCurley and Guttentag (1971i.).-9-.
The dependency of mortgage terminations on interest rates operates
through three channels. First, the willingness of homeowners to sell their
houses depends on current mortgage rates relative to the rate on their
existing mortgages. For example, if rates are currently high, then homeowners
will be reluctent to forego the implicit capital gains they have on their
existing mortgages. Reduced mobility means fewer mortgage terminations.
Second, even if homeowners do sell, in some cases the mortgage will be
assumed by the new buyer. All FRA/VA mortgages are assumable, and, while
the standard deed of trust for conventional mortgages generally does not
allow assumptions, some obviously occur. More assumptions imply fewer
terminations. Third, even when no house sale occurs, the existing mortgage
can be terminated. If mortgage rates decline below the coupon rates on
existing mortgages by enough to outweigh the costs of refinancing, including
closing costs, repayment penalties and additional points charged the
borrower, then mortgages will be terminated and refinanced at the current
existing low rates.
The data in Table 1 support dependency of termination rates on the
spread between past and current mortgage coupon rates. These data
are termination rates for mortgages issued in particular years (endorsement
years) cuznmulated through the third and sixth years after issue (the policy
years less one). The two sections in the table distinguish between
periods when early termination is less likely (mortgage rates in subsequent
8Consumers have used a variety of devices such as wrap around" mortgages
and land sales contracts to assume. The economics of due on sale clauses
is described in detail in an April 1981 HtJ1) report to Congress; the legality
of these and other creative financing mechanisms will eventually be ruled
on by the Supreme Court. Also, variable rate mortgage contracts typically
allow assumptions.-10-
years rose relative to the issue rate) and. more likely (the reverse).
The selection of years does not, of course, hold the expost pattern of
mortgage rates precisely constant relative to the issue rates, but it is
close enough to reveal the expected pattern of slower terminations of
mortgages originated during the troughs of the interest rate cycle (upper
half of table) and faster terminations of mortgages originated during the
peaks of the interest rate cycle (lower half of table).9
III. Uncertain Inflation and Mortgage Coupon Rates
While the most likely terminations schedule isa useful concept,
the above discussion suggests that there isa large array of schedules
that might occur with significant probability, at leastone for every
inflation-interest rate senario. Moreover, each senarioimplies a
different set of discount rates (y's). Assume that thereare N viable
inflation-interest rate senarios that are expected tooccur with
N
probabilitiesp ,p,... p,wherep =1.Denote the total mortgage 12 N
j=i
payment and discount rate vectors associated with the jth senario(and
its terminations schedule) by TMPAY(j) and y(j),respectively. Then,
the value of a pool of mortgages in theuncertainty case can be expressed as
9The fewapparent anomalies in the table are explainedby differences in subsequent movements in interest rates. Forexample, the acceleration between the third and sixthyears in terminations of mortgages issued in
1957-58 is likely dueto the decline in mortgage rates inthe early 1960s relative to the levelexisting in 1957-58, and the slow early
termination of l971 issues relative to1970 issues is due to the minor
decline in mortgage rates in 1975-76versus the sharp decline in 1971-72.-11-
Table 1
for Section 203(b) 30-Year Home Mortgages %
Year of Endorsement (Should TerminateLate)
Policy Year 1957-58 1961+_65 1971-72 1977
Less One
3 1.7 6.3 9.7 16.2
6 19.7 15.0 3O.4
Year of Endorsement (Should Terminate Early)
1960-61 1970 1974
3 8.6 19.5 16.2





By substituting kVU from equation (3.1)intoequation (1.6), we obtain
an expression for the efficient market price of mortgage contracts.
Conceptually, one could test for market efficiency by conaring this to
observed prices. Empirically, this requires knowledge of the market's
subjective probabilities of various interest rate scenarios (the y(j)'s)
and the relationship between ex post interest rates and cash flows
(the TMPAY(j)'s). Because we do not currently have such information,
such a test is beyond the scope of the current paper.
With TMPAY and y based on the in (most likely) inflation-interest rate
outcome and p =1,equation (3.1) reduces to (1.5). Comparison of these
expressions is instructive. A higher than most-likely inflation rate
lowers the present value of a given payment stream relative to
the most-likely rate by raising the discount factors, while a
lower than most-likely inflation rate raises the present value. When
the payment stream is independent of the inflation-interest rate
outcome, one would expect klftl =kVfor the same mortgage coupon rate.
That is, mortgage values --likesecurity values generally --wouldbe
affected by deviations in observed inflation-interest rate outcomes from
those originally expected, but not by changes in the degree of uncertainty-
regardingthese outcomes. However, the payment stream and thus mortgage
values are not independent of these outcomes. A higher than most-likely
inflation rate reduces mobility by creating capital gains on existing
mortgages and increases the assumption of existing mortgages by buyers when
moves do occur. The lower termination rate magnifies the decline in present
value caused by higher discount rates. A lower than most-likely inflation rate
increases mobility by reducing existing capital gains and encourages
refinancing of existing mortgages. Now, however, the higher termination
rate mitigates the rise in present value caused by lower discount rates.
Because of the asymmetric variation in termination rates, kV"
10
for mortgage pools based on the same mortgage coupon rate. Further,
kv -willbe disproportionately greater the larger is the variability
of expectations regarding inflation and thus the greater both the
likelihood of and resultant loss from adverse terminations.11
The terminations option allows borrowers to repay at faster
(refinancings) or slower (assumptions) rates, depending upon which is
to their economic advantage (and thus to the lender's disadvantage).
Borrowers will have to pay for this option either once in the form of a
front-end fee when the mortgage is issued or annually in a higher
coupon. When the front-end fee is employed, the price of the option is
10Dunn and McConnell (l981a) havecalculated kv and kVU under some hypothetical
assumptions regarding interest rates. First, a yield curve generating
function is posited and a level of interest rate (yield curve) uncertainty
is specified. Then (3.1) is evaluated under the assumption that the
mortgage pool will be terminated if the new is sue mortgage rate falls
below the coupon rate of the pool. For the certainty case, no "optimal"
terminations are allowed (suboptixna]. terminations are assumed to follow
100 or 200 FHA experience.)
11Conceptually, the difference in price should be thepresent value of the
expected losses. In our earlier paper (1980), we provided several models
to determine both the probability that the option will be exercised
at a given point In time and the magnitude of the loss if it is.- 114-
known.When the higher couponmethod isutilized, computation of the
annual premium would seem to be a straight-forwardapplication of equations
(1.5)and (3.1)for the case of newly-issued mortgage pools (k=0).
Equation (3.1) is solved for 0V, and then equation (1.5)isemployed to
determinethe coupon rate that wouldequate to .Thisis the
couponthat is required in the certainty case. The differencebetween the
actual coupon and the certaintycoupon is the annual premium of the
terminationsoption.12 Unfortunately, thereare no mortgages with certain
termination rates, i.e., equation (1.5) cannot be utilized.
Nevertheless, it is possible with one key assumption to obtain
estimates of the terminations premium in GNMAcouponrates. The assumption
is that the only difference in theeyes of investors between a GNMApool
anda comparable maturity portfolio of U.S. government bondsis the
uncertainty regarding the timing ofthecash flows (the term.iriation schedule)
ofthepool. Given that the incomes from the pool and theportfolio
are taxed similarly andare subject to thesame zero default risk, this
assumptionwould seem to be a reasonable working hypothesis.With this
assumption, the bondportfoliois equivalent to a mortgagepool witha certain
terminationsschedule, andthedifference between the actual coupon rate
onthe pool and the"effective" couponon the bond portfolio is the
terminations premium.
A comparable maturity bond portfolio has cashflows that are equal
to those on a mortgage pool (based on the mostlikely terminations schedule)
after netting out the terminations option premium inthemortgage coupon.
The default premium inthe coupon rate can be calculatedsimilarly. First, equation (3.1) is solved for0V on the assumption that all payments willbe made on schedule. Second, the 'sare altered to reflect expected
defaults; the left-side of (3.1) is set equal to thevalue obtained
assuming no default; and thecoupon, jd, is solved for. This is the
coupon including the default premium. Thepremium is d-15-
Definea new-issue bond portfolio of value as
M
B =kj =k÷1'
where is the portion of the portfolio maturing in periodj and '= 1.
The total (principal plus interest) payment on theportfolio in period t,
assuming zero default and call risk, is
(3.2) TBPAYt =+ Ejyi)p,
where y isthecoupon rate in period oona par bond with maturity j.
Notethat Y the yield on a pure discount security of maturity j.
The most likely payment on a mortgage in period t, after netting out theoptions





where the most likely terminations rates ()havereplaced the certain
terminations rates ().Abondportfolio that is comparable to a mortgage
pool with expected net payments TMPAY' is one in which the are chosen such that
(3.lt) TBPAYt =TMPAY(1÷y)V3
forall t. The(l+y)h/3factor adjusts for the fact that mortgage payments-16-
accrue roughly 1/3 of a semi-annualperiodprior to the payments on the
bonds; y is the one-period rateecpected to exist in the tth period.14
Equation (3.L) represents M-k equations that, along with the identity
.=1,determine M-k v's and p for the given q5'5,yt, a, k'k' and 1.
Actually,itis possible to solve for p withoutdetermining the V's.
Substitution of (3.3) into (1.5) and the result into (1.6)yields, after
canceling PRIN and X which are equal for newly issued pools (k0)




Given the 's, a, 1, the y's, andk' this equation can be solved for p.
We note here that the appropriate discountrates are still the yield.s on
risk-free pure discount securities of thematching maturity because the
cash-flows are, after adjusting for terminationsuncertainty, risk-free
equivalents (recall that GNMA securitiesare default free). The terminations
premium approach avoids the "coupon bias"problem inherent in alternative
treatments [see Kaufman andMorgan(1980)].
In general,mortgage payments are received at the end of themonth. Thus the total payments for a six-monthperiod are received, on average, 3
months into the period, not at the end.Because GNMA, pools pay on the 15thday of the following month, "the" semi-annualpayment can be viewed asoccurrIng1/3 of' a period prior to the paymentson the bonds.
14lis determined from the yields onpurediscount bonds as (1+yt)t/(l÷yti)t_1_ '•-17-
IV. Calculation of the Terminations Premium
Before reportingthe results, a few words about the sources and
measurement of the data are in order. The period investigated is the
110 month span covering January 1978toApril 1981. The discount rates
arethe yieldson purediscountbonds calculated from the decompounded
pointyields computed by McCulloch (1975).15 The mortgage prices and
16 couponsare those on GNI4Apoolstrading closest to par. The time
interval employed is six months; thus N =60for 30 year mortgages.
Thepremiaare calculated by solving equation (3.5).
Three different terminations schedules are tested. The first two
aresimply 100 and200%experienceon FHPmortgagesoriginated since
1957(Herzog,1981, p. 21). The third attempts to incorporate the
impact of differences between pooi coupon rates and new issue coupon rates
on the most likelyterminationsschedule.
Specifically, the schedule varies between 100and200%FH overtime,
depending on the difference between par (unity) and the price of the pool.17
Whenthe pool is at par, investors are assumed to expect the pool to
terminate at 200%FHA.When the pool is at 0.9 (the lowest price in our
sample is 0.911), investors are assumed to expect 100%FHA terminations.
15 t-k 1 -1/3 Because the point yields are instantaneous decompounded, (l+y )(1+y) in
equation (3.5) is replaced by e(t_c)1t_Yt/3We thank Huston McCulloch for
supplying us with these data.
16
The prices are averages of the bid and ask quotes from the Wall Street Journal
for the first day of the month that the prices appeared in the Journal.
171n one calculation Dunn and McConnell (l981b)assume that the prepayment
probabilities Et/(1_T)J "decay exponentially as the riskiess interest
rate at that time rises above the security's coupon rate •"(p.18)-18-
More precisely, we determine x in equation (2.1) from
= - 800.
Figure 1 contains plots of obasedupon the three terminations
schedules, denoted 100, 200 and VAR(forvariable). Because the three
series are closely related we shall discuss the VAR series only. The
o's are very law for the January 1978-September 1978 period, averaging
only 5 basis points. They rise to an average of 25 basis points in the
October 1978-May 1979 period, to Ls7 basis points in the June-September
1979 period, and on to 97 basis points in the October 1979-April 1980
interval. A final increase, to an average of l21 basis points, occurs
inthe July-October 1980 period, with a high of l5Ii basis points in
August. The last six observations show a decrease to 102 basis points.
Weargued above that the primary determinant of changes in theterm-
inationspremium is changes in uncertainty regarding future interest rates.
Given the well-established re1atonship between inflation rates and interest
rates since 1951, the future course of interest rates is heavily dependent
on future inflation rates, as well as monetary policy and other factors
that influence real interest rates.18 In the introduction to this paper,
two pieces of evidence were given for the belief that interest-rate
uncertainty had risen, namely the recent increase in inflation uncertainty
and the reduction in October 1979 in the importance the Federal Reserve
attaches to interest rate stability.
(1975) and (1977) is most closelyassociated with the view that
movements innominalinterest rates have largely been due to changes inthe
inflation rate. Hendershott (1981)indicatesthat this wasnotthe case inthequarter century prior to 1951.Forevidence that real interest





















































































































































Anavailable measure of inflation uncertainty is the standard deviation
ofone-year inflation forecasts of the participants in the Livingston
investment survey. The one-year inflation forecasts are measured in early
June and early December of each year. Thestandarddeviation of these
forecasts (in percentage points), beginning with December 1977 and
proceeding through December 1980, are 1.15, 1.37, 1.39, 2.09, 1.79,
2.ui3, and 2.01. The values for June are assumed to hold until the next
December, and the December values are assumed to be maintained untilthe
next June.
Specification of a continuous variable to reflect the emphasis
(perceived by market participants) the monetary authorities have placed
on interest rate stability is difficult. Our basic procedure is to
examine the width of the target rangeforthe Federal funds rate stated
in open market directives.19 Unfortunately, the range is likely to reflect
the authorities' perception of interest-rate uncertainty as well as the
weight the authorities attach to interest-rate stability. For example,
while the range of the targeted Federal funds rate varied only between
0.25 and 0.75 percentage points during the mid 1977 to September 18, 1979
period of relatively stable interest rates, the width of the range given
at the March 18-19, 197I open market meeting, when short-term rates were
rising sharply, was a full 1.5 percentage points. Thus it would be a
mistake to attribute every small change in the width of the band to a
change in the weight given to interest-rate stability.
19The directives arepublished in the Federal Reserve Bulletin about 90 clays
after the open market committee meets.-21-
Twomajor changes in the width of the band occurred in late 1979
arid,early 1980. OnOctober6, 1979,the band was raised from 0.5 to
1+.Opercentage points. (The largest previous width was the 1.5 percentage
points cited above.) Simultaneously the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board announced a change in the implementation of monetary policy whereby
stabilityinthe growthofmonetary aggregates, rather than nominal interest
rates, would be emphasized. It seems apparent that themarket's perception
20 of interest rate uncertainty should have increased at this time.
The band. stayed at Lo percentage points until March 18, 1980, when it was
increased to 7.0. At the next meeting (April 22, 1980) the band was
lowered to 6.0, and it varied between this and 5.0 percentage points
through the end of our estimation period. Because interest rates were
quite volatile arowid the March 18 meeting -- theweekly average funds
rate increased by 3 percentage points between the weeks ending on March 1
arid March 29, the increase in the band to 7.0 percentage points may not
have reflected a change in policy. To test for the impact of the monetary
policy shift, two dummy variables are tested. The first is zero before
October 1979 and one thereafter; the second is zero before March 1980
and one thereafter.
The regression equations reported in Table 2 support our conjecture
that changes in uncertainty regarding inflation and real interest rates
determine the terminations premia. The equations explain 90 percent of
20
It is noteworthy that the federal funds rate was not especially volatile
at this time. The weekly average funds rate had increased by only 3/14
percentage points over the previous five weeks and increased by only 9





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































thevariance in the calculated premia, which is somewhat surprising
given both the crude proxies for the expected variances in inflation and
in real interest rates and the potential errors in the measurement of
the premia (errors in the measurement of the 's and yts)• All regressors
enter with the expected positive signs and are significantly greater than
zero at the 95 percent confidence level. The 2's and the closeness of
the Durbin-Watson ratios to 2 are consistent with the view that no major
explanatory variables have been omitted.
The three equations tell basically the same story. When the standard
deviationof expected inflation was just below unity, the terminations
premia was roughly zero in the pre-October 1979 world. A percentage
point increase in this standard deviation raises the premium by nearly
35to 40 basis points. The October 1979 shift Inmonetary policy away
fromnarrow interest rate targets raised the premia by nearly 50 basis
points, and an apparent further downgrading of the importance of interest
rate stability in April 1980 increased the premia by another 15 basis
21
points.
of the square of the standard deviation of expected Inflation
and the difference between the price of the pool and par did not raise
the explanatory power of the relationship.V. Conclusion
The costoffinancing housing has risenrelativeto thecost of
Treasuryborrowing inrecent years. The difference between the coupon
rates on par value, government-insured GNMAmortgagepoolsanda portfolio
ofTreasurysecuritieswith identical expected cash flowsrose from
5basispoints in thefirst half of1978 to 125basispoints in the middle
of 1980, declining only slightly to 100 basis points in early 1981. To
some this mightsuggest excess profits to be made; to others, a need
for the expansion offederal secondary mortgage marketactivities.Neither
Interpretationis necessarily correct.
Mortgage coupon rates include terminationspremia to compensate
lenders for expected reductions in effective yields owing to borrowers
repaying faster when interest rates decline and slower when they rise.
Boththelikelihood of adverse (to the lender) terminations andthecost
ofthemincrease with uncertainty regarding futureinterestrates, and
thisuncertainty has risen in recent years. The rise reflects both
greater uncertainty about the inflation premium in Interest rates and a
reduction in the importance the monetary authorities attach to interest
ratestability. If the relative rise in mortgage coupon rates reflects
solely an increase ii the terminations premia in response to greater interest
rate uncertainty, then there are neither extraordinary opportunities for
profitsnor substantial market imperfections for correction.
Differencesbetween GNMA and Treasury coupon rates were calculated
for three alternative mortgage termination schedules. If the mortgage
market is fully integrated with bond markets, then these differences
are simply terminations premia. The differences in coupon rates were then-25-
regressedon proxies developed for interest rate uncertainty. The results
are consistent with the view that the measured premia are, Indeed, terminations
premia (up to a random measurement error), and thus that the market for
GNMApoolsis fullyintegratedwith bond markets. If this is so, there
areno extraordinary profit opportunities for lenders to exploit and no
mortgage market inefficiencies for policymakers to correct.-26-
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